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 DRAFTING THE NEPAL
 CONSTITUTION, 1990
 Michael Hutt
 On November 9, 1990, King Birendra Bir Bikram
 Shah promulgated a new constitution for the Kingdom of Nepal that en-
 shrined several basic concepts which the country's banned political parties
 had demanded ever since King Mahendra's "royal coup" of December 15,
 1960. The constitution has so far proved generally acceptable to the prin-
 cipal political parties in Nepal and is the main achievement of the Move-
 ment for the Restoration of Democracy launched on February 18, 1990. It
 is also the latest product of a long search for appropriate political institu-
 tions and processes in Nepal, begun soon after the British departure from
 India and the subsequent collapse of the Rana regime in 1950-51.
 The 1990 Constitution is Nepal's fifth. The first one was promulgated in
 1948 and was an attempt by the ruler of the time, Padma Shamsher, to
 shore up the fast-crumbling Rana regime. After it collapsed, an Interim
 Government Act came into force in 1951 and was not replaced until 1959,
 the year of Nepal's first general election. In 1960, King Mahendra re-
 voked this "democratic" constitution, using the emergency powers it had
 granted him, and he reassumed all powers of government. Although
 amended three times, the 1962 Constitution promulgated for "a partyless
 Panchayat democracy," remained in force until 1990. It banned political
 parties, vested sovereignty in the king, and made him the source of all
 legislative, executive, and judicial power; the 1962 Constitution has, there-
 fore, always been controversial, not to say notorious.1
 Michael Hutt is Lecturer in Nepali at the School of Oriental and
 African Studies, University of London.
 ? 1991 by The Regents of the University of California
 1. For an in-depth analysis of Nepali politics between 1950 and 1964, see Bhuwan Lal
 Joshi and Leo E. Rose, Democratic Innovations in Nepal (Berkeley: University of California
 Press, 1966). See also Hem Narayan Agrawal, Nepal. A Study in Constitutional Change
 (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1980). For English translations of earlier constitu-
 tions, see The Constitution of the Kingdom of Nepal (New Delhi: Nepal Book Centre, 1959),
 and The Constitution of Nepal with First, Second, and Third Amendments (Kathmandu:
 1020
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 The following chronology of the struggles, debates, and controversies
 surrounding the framing of the 1990 Constitution from the legalization of
 political parties in April to its promulgation in November demonstrates
 the extent to which uncertainty persists in Nepal about the direction in
 which political development should proceed, the role the monarch should
 play in this development, and the uncertainty of the palace itself about the
 extent of its own power in the future. There is also evidence of a signifi-
 cant disparity between popular priorities for change and those of the na-
 tional leadership.
 On the morning of April 6, 1990, King Birendra broadcast a proclama-
 tion on Radio Nepal to the nation that was remarkable for the concessions
 it made to the Democracy Movement, especially in view of the administra-
 tion's former intransigence. Charging the Council of Ministers with fail-
 ure to understand the "tradition of public consent" and causing loss of life
 and property, the king announced the formation of a new council (under
 National Panchayat member Lokendra Bahadur Chand) that would hold
 talks with "people holding different political views." The king invoked
 Article 81(1), "Formation of the Council of Ministers in Extraordinary
 Circumstances," of the 1962 Constitution, and he also promised to form
 two committees, one for constitution reform suggestions and one to inves-
 tigate recent violence.
 The Democratic Movement was launched by an alliance between the
 Nepali Congress Party and the newly formed United Left Front (Sanyukta
 Bam Morcha, ULF) on February 18 and had reached its climax by early
 April, resulting in massive civil disorder throughout the kingdom.2 When
 security forces shot several dozen unarmed demonstrators in the streets
 outside the royal palace on April 6, despite the king's concessions that very
 morning, the situation had clearly deteriorated to such an extent that even
 the movement's leaders were only nominally in control. Factions within
 the movement were escalating their demands, calling not for a constitu-
 tional monarchy but for the abolition of the monarchy itself.3 To restore
 HMG, Ministry of Law and Justice, 4th ed., 1983). Agrawal summarizes the Rana Constitu-
 tion of 1948 (pp. 8-21) and the Interim Constitution of 1951 (pp. 22-31).
 2. The Nepali Congress, the oldest and most broadly based party in Nepal, was formed
 during the last years of the Rana regime. It is of a general center-left political complexion
 and represents a diversity of interests. The ULF was a coalition formed in late 1989 by eight
 factions of the Nepal Communist Party (NCP).
 3. The mood in the Kathmandu Valley after the royal proclamation of April 6 was joyous.
 It is not at all clear why this mood changed so dramatically during a mass meeting on the
 Tundikhel parade ground that afternoon, or why a large section of the crowd that had gath-
 ered there decided to march on the king's palace. Martin Hoftun, a Norwegian historian who
 was present in Kathmandu at the time, suggested that this may have been a response to police
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 public order, a 22-hour curfew was declared in Kathmandu and Lalitpur
 from April 7 and in Bhaktapur from April 8.
 Legalization
 The king made a further, fundamental concession two days later by lifting
 the 30-year ban on political parties and deleting the term "partyless" from
 the 1962 Constitution. After an audience with the king, the four main
 leaders of the Democracy Movement (Krishna Prasad Bhattarai and
 Girija Prasad Koirala of the Nepali Congress and Sahana Pradhan and
 Radha Krishna Mainali of the ULF) announced that the movement had
 been called off since their two main demands had been granted. During
 the struggle that followed in subsequent months between the palace and
 the political parties, the movement leaders were regularly criticized for
 making this decision too soon. Many activists argued that their demands
 should have included the abrogation of the 1962 Constitution, the promul-
 gation of an interim act, and the election of a constituent assembly to draft
 the new constitution. These complaints came from elements within the
 ULF as well as from parties not represented in it and were leveled princi-
 pally at the leaders of the Nepali Congress whose response was that, since
 these demands were not made before April 8, it was not appropriate to
 make them now.
 On April 12 a joint meeting of the Nepali Congress and the ULF made
 demands that included the dissolution of the National Panchayat and
 Council of Ministers, the repeal of all provisions of the 1962 Constitution
 that conflicted with a multiparty system, the dissolution of Panchayat
 units from village to district level, and the formation of a constitution com-
 mission with "adequate representation" of the Nepali Congress and the
 ULF. In a New Year message to the nation on April 14, the king affirmed:
 "Politics in Nepal has now taken a new turn. We have upheld the tradi-
 tion of respecting the popular will and fulfilling the people's aspirations.
 The Constitution Reforms Commission in the process of being set up in
 the near future will consult elements of society professing different political
 views in the course of preparing its report."4 The palace view at this early
 stage was clearly that it was at liberty to form a body that would submit
 suggestions to the king for reforms of the 1962 Constitution. It soon be-
 came clear that this view did not accord with that of the Democracy
 Movement.
 provocation or to a call from the Mashal faction (which was not part of the ULF) of the
 NCP, which had organized the rally.
 4. Nepal Press Digest 34:16, April 16, 1990.
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 Formation of an Interim Government
 Events moved rapidly after the Hindu New Year had been ushered in. On
 April 15 five government ministers and five representatives of the Nepali
 Congress and the ULF sat down in the Royal Nepal Academy to begin
 negotiations. Outside, several thousand demonstrators surrounded the
 building, demanding the dissolution of all Panchayat institutions and the
 formation of an interim government. The participants in this meeting
 were effectively besieged: when the newly appointed Prime Minister
 Chand attempted to leave, his car was wrecked by the crowd. Clearly the
 more radical elements feared betrayal.
 Nevertheless, the negotiators escaped from the academy after 14 hours
 of talks, and the next day a royal proclamation announced the resignation
 of the hapless Chand ministry after only ten days in office, as well as the
 dissolution of the National Panchayat, the Panchayat Policy and Evalua-
 tion Committee, and the Class Organizations.5 Clause (2) of Article 81 of
 the 1962 Constitution, which empowered the king in extraordinary cir-
 cumstances to suspend articles 25 to 29 on the formation and functioning
 of the Council of Ministers and dissolution of the National Panchayat, was
 invoked to do just that. Articles 41B and 67A that provided for the
 Panchayat Policy and Evaluation Committee and the Class Organizations,
 respectively, were suspended, as was clause 2A of Article 11, which pre-
 scribed that "no political party or any other organisation, union, or associ-
 ation motivated by party politics shall be formed or be caused to be formed
 or run." Later the same day (April 16) the king asked Ganesh Man Singh,
 the supreme leader of the Nepali Congress, to form an interim government
 but Singh declined on grounds of ill-health and asked the king to head the
 government himself. This the king declined to do, and eventually Krishna
 Prasad Bhattarai, the party chairman, was selected, with the ULF's agree-
 ment. Portfolios were allocated on April 18 and the new prime minister
 was sworn in the following day. The new Council of Ministers was made
 up of 11 ministers-four members of the Congress, three of the ULF, two
 independents with records of work in human rights organizations, and two
 palace nominees.6
 5. Article 67A of the 1962 Constitution provided for the formation of six class organiza-
 tions of women, peasants, youths, elders, laborers, and ex-servicemen "with a view to inte-
 grate and utilize the united strength of the various classes." Membership in one of these class
 organizations was made "compulsory for any person contesting as a candidate in the election
 of any level of Panchayat." (The Constitution of Nepal [Kathmandu HMG, 1983]).
 6. The new ministers (mantri-parishad) were: Krishna Prasad Bhattarai, Mahendra
 Narayan Nidhi, Yoga Prasad Upadhyaya, and Marshal Julum Shakaya (Congress); Sahana
 Pradhan (NCP [Marxist]), Nilambar Acharya (NCP [Manandhar]), Jhal Nath Khanal (NCP
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 On the left of the political spectrum, few groups were willing to trust the
 palace to make its promised concessions to democracy. The editorial of
 the Drishti newspaper on April 18 declared, "the King cannot be a leader.
 No one can be above the Constitution. The King must stay in his palace
 ... if the Crown tries to support dictatorial ideals, a movement will be
 launched which will abolish the monarchy itself."7 The ULF parties had
 probably reconciled themselves to the retention of a constitutional monar-
 chy in order to achieve a working compromise with the Nepali Congress,
 but leftist groups outside the front, such as Mashal, considered this a tem-
 porary measure-a step on the way to a totally republican state.8 Thus,
 they orchestrated a hue and cry each time the king appeared to take deci-
 sions without what they considered sufficient consultation.
 From this time onward, various groups began to make their own de-
 mands regarding the new constitution. The Movement for the Restoration
 of Democracy had not been a constitutional movement as such; its de-
 mands were not couched in constitutional intricacies but were simply for
 the legalization of parties, a constitutional monarchy, and a respect for
 human rights. Once the movement was called off, a large number of new
 parties emerged, many of which represented ethnic, religious, and regional
 concerns. On April 23 the situation in the Kathmandu valley approached
 anarchy when six policemen were beaten to death and subsequent police
 firing killed about a dozen demonstrators. By April 26 night curfews had
 been imposed throughout the valley. The widespread rumor of an immi-
 nent palace-led coup was eventually squashed on April 25 when the palace
 issued a press release in which the king urged the nation to support the
 interim government: "The interests of the country and the people lie in
 the development and strengthening of multi-party democracy. The Gov-
 ernment headed by Krishna Prasad Bhattarai should be fully supported."9
 On April 24 the Nepali Congress and the ULF issued a joint directive to
 the interim government that made the following points about the new con-
 stitution:
 The new Constitution must be fully democratic; the King must become a consti-
 tutional monarch; the King must act only on the advice of the Council of Minis-
 ters. All institutions and laws not conducive to democraticisation must be
 repealed. Democratic rights must be ensured for all citizens. Institutions and
 [Marxist-Leninist]); Devendra Raj Pandey and Mathura Prasad Shreshtha (independents);
 and Keshar Jang Rayamajhi and Achyut Raj Regmi (royal nominees).
 7. Nepal Press Digest 34:17, April 23, 1990.
 8. Led by "Prachand," the Mashal faction of the NCP remains committed to Maoist
 revolution and denounces the Marxist-Leninists for their revisionism. It is not to be confused
 with the Masal faction, led by Mohan Bikram Singh, from which it split in 1981.
 9. Nepal Press Digest 34:18, April 30, 1990.
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 processes must be developed for the protection of democracy. A free election
 must be held as soon as possible, and an independent Election Commission must
 be formed for this purpose. There should be press and academic freedom, and
 equal rights for women.10
 The Constitution Commission
 The questions of who should frame and approve the new constitution were
 debated fiercely for weeks, and the eventual solution to the problem did
 not find favor in all quarters. Most of the leftist parties outside the ULF
 demanded the promulgation of an interim constitution and direct elections
 on a political party basis to a constituent assembly. Several groups- nota-
 bly the Nepal Communist Party (4th Convention), the United Nepal Peo-
 ple's Movement, and the Masal and Mashal factions-continued to make
 these demands throughout the year, and when the new Constitution was
 finally promulgated, they refused to recognize it. The leaders of the Nepali
 Congress resisted very vigorously. On May 4 Mathbar Singh Basnet, one
 of the four official spokesmen for the party, dismissed the idea of a constit-
 uent assembly as an "intellectual luxury" on the grounds that all parties,
 including the Congress and the communists, had contested the 1959 gen-
 eral election under a constitution promulgated by King Mahendra. 1 It
 may be that the Congress felt, as supreme leader Singh later stated, that
 the king could not be pushed too far too fast and that the notion of a
 constitution, which derived from the people and not the king, would pro-
 voke a reaction from the palace. It is also clear that the policy of "national
 reconciliation" between the palace and the people pursued by the late B. P.
 Koirala continues to be a part of Nepali Congress philosophy. 12 On July 6
 Singh quoted B. P. Koirala as having said, "in a tussle between the Nepali
 Congress and the King, democracy would be the only casualty." 13 The
 official line pursued by many Congress spokesmen, however, was that an
 interim act and the election of a constituent assembly would delay the gen-
 eral election, and that this was the communists' real objective in making
 such demands.
 Soon, however, it seemed that the Congress's trust in the palace to con-
 form with democratic norms had been misplaced, or else that the two sides
 had not fully understood one another's aims. On May 11, without consult-
 10. Ibid.
 1 1. Nepal Press Digest 34:19, May 7, 1990.
 12. See Shashi P. Mishra, B. P. Koirala: A Case Study in Third World Democratic Leader-
 ship (Bhubaneshwar and Varanasi: Konark, 1985); also B. P. Koirala, Melmildpko Sharta:
 Rdshtriyatd ra Prajftantra (Arguments for harmony: Nationhood and democracy) (Kath-
 mandu, 1982).
 13. Nepal Press Digest 34:30, July 23, 1990.
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 ing the interim government, King Birendra formed a seven-man Constitu-
 tion Reforms Recommendation Commission and directed it to submit
 recommendations to him within three months for changes to the 1962
 Constitution. This was in direct contradiction to the ULF's demand for a
 commission that would include representatives of both political parties
 within the interim government. Prime Minister Bhattarai shamefacedly
 admitted that he had not been consulted by the king before the formation
 of the commission. Demonstrating what appeared to be genuine political
 naivete, he said that there were no real grounds for discontent, since the
 king had advised him that the government would be free to reject the new
 constitution. "The King told me," he said, "he was not aware of the fact
 that there is a party behind me which has to be satisfied, because there
 have been no political parties functioning in the country for a long time.
 He also did not consider such matters as the fact that there was a coalition
 Government. So it has happened."14
 Predictably, few leaders were as sanguine as Bhattarai about this at-
 tempt by the palace to capture the constitution-drafting process. Girija
 Prasad Koirala, the general secretary of the Congress, described it as "a
 great insult to the people of Nepal." He rejected the idea of reforming the
 1962 Constitution and demanded a completely new dispensation. The
 commission should be dissolved immediately, he said, and in this he re-
 ceived the support of most leftist leaders. The ULF described the forma-
 tion of the commission as "undemocratic and disgraceful" and the
 Congress called for its dissolution and reconstitution in consultation with
 the interim government. This incident was the first of several palace at-
 tempts to regain, as it were, the high ground during the drafting of the new
 constitution. On each occasion, a hostile reaction from the press, the pub-
 lic, and political parties forced a retreat, but such incidents demonstrated
 either that the king and his palace secretariat were not sincerely commit-
 ted to the direction of political change upon which Nepal had embarked
 (the leftist view, perhaps) or that the king, inexperienced in dealings with
 free and active political parties, was adjusting only slowly to the changed
 circumstances (the public view of some in the Congress).
 In any event, the palace ploy was a damp squib. The commission's
 chairman, Justice Bishwanath Upadhyaya, resigned and three of the six
 other members refused to join at all. The commission was dissolved after
 only four days. Unprecedented criticisms were leveled at the king. Man
 Mohan Adhikari of the NCP (Marxist) had already said, "the King should
 no longer be considered an incarnation of Vishnu. He too is a man, and a
 man can make mistakes." The Drishti weekly of May 16 exclaimed, "the
 14. Nepal Press Digest 34:20, May 14, 1990.
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 nation has been stunned by what His Majesty did on May 11. That step
 . . .was clearly aimed at turning the monarchy once again toward the
 tendencies of the Panchayat period, and reinstating the despotism of the
 Palace in every vital sphere."'5 This incident revived the demand for an
 interim constitution that vested sovereignty in the Nepali people, a de-
 mand that was taken up even by some senior Congress officials. Bhattarai
 was instructed to consult the Council of Ministers and other parties in
 nominating members for a new commission. Adhikari, filled with right-
 eous indignation, demanded that the new body should not include anyone
 who had connections with the palace, the administration, or the "black
 history" of the previous 30 years.16
 On May 22 the king vested the legislative and executive powers of the
 dissolved National Panchayat in the interim government, under Article
 81(2)(b) of the 1962 Constitution. Despite this, Singh complained on June
 1 that the government was still hindered by a lack of judicial power, which
 had not yet been granted to it. Critics of the government said that it was
 still operating under the 1962 Constitution, minus the word "partyless,"
 and that it therefore still sought palace approval for every move it made.
 Policy guidelines, issued for the interim government on June 4, stated:
 "The main tasks of the Interim Government will be to maintain law and
 order, develop a multi-party system on the basis of Constitutional monar-
 chy, draft a new Constitution, and hold General Elections."17
 A new Constitution Recommendations Commission nominated by
 Bhattarai was inaugurated by the king at the end of May. The nine-mem-
 ber commission was again chaired by Justice Upadhyaya of the Supreme
 Court. The main political parties accorded the commission a cautious wel-
 come. Adhikari objected to the inclusion of the word "recommendations"
 in its title, while leaders of the Marxist-Leninist faction of the NCP de-
 manded that it should form a new constitution, which should be presented
 to the interim government for final approval, not to the king. Soon after
 the formation of the commission, Justice Upadhyaya explained that each
 of its members had been assigned specific topics on which they would col-
 lect suggestions from political parties and the general public and report
 back to the commission. A deadline of July 4 was set for the submission of
 suggestions. Later in the month, six members of the commission were sent
 out to tour various zones of the country to canvas opinions, and the Con-
 gress lawyer, Daman Dhungana, was sent to Britain to study constitu-
 15. Ibid.
 16. Ibid.
 17. Nepal Press Digest 34:24, June 11, 1990.
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 tional issues, especially relations between an elected government and the
 crown.
 Justice Upadhyaya later expressed dismay over the fact that the vast
 majority of suggestions submitted to the commission concerned linguistic,
 religious, ethnic, and regional issues. Since the "unification" of Nepal in
 the late eighteenth century, political power had been monopolized by the
 "twice-born" Brahmin and Chetri castes, and the language and culture
 promoted by the government have been those of the Hindu populations of
 the hill regions.18 The "tribal" hill people who speak Tibeto-Burman lan-
 guages, such as the Rai, Limbu, Tamang, and Gurung, are under-
 represented at all levels of government, while the Tarai population-many
 of whom are of more recent Indian origin-suffer discrimination at the
 hands of the state bureaucracy. The demands made to the Constitution
 Recommendations Commission for recognition of languages other than
 Nepali and religions other than Hinduism and for the proportional repre-
 sentation of minority groups in the legislature reflect the growth of com-
 munal grievances among minority and regional groupings in Nepal that
 are based on socioeconomic realities. Rather than attempting to accom-
 modate these grievances, the commission and the interim government sim-
 ply perceived them as a threat to national unity, and virtually dismissed
 them out of hand. Thus, Justice Upadhyaya said it was "unfortunate" that
 most suggestions had been about "peripheral" issues, and he called upon
 all political parties to educate the people on basic constitutional subjects.19
 In an interview on July 9, Upadhyaya confirmed that most political
 parties had made identical suggestions for a constitutional monarchy, a
 multiparty democracy, adult franchise, a bicameral legislature, and the
 sovereignty of the people. But he expressed some concern over the proce-
 dure to be adopted for the promulgation of the new constitution: "The
 individual or institution who gives the Constitution is sovereign. The peo-
 ple will be sovereign if there is a Constituent Assembly, but we have not
 followed that path. If the Constitution is granted by the King, under what
 power should he do so?"2o The NCP (Masal) concurred with this view:
 "We do not believe that the King will give up his powers and hand over
 sovereignty to the people. After all, even the new Constitution will be a
 gift from the King. How can a mango tree bear oranges?"2'
 18. Martin Hoftun remarked in a lecture at the School of Oriental and African Studies on
 January 24, 199 1: "The Brahmin and Chetri leaders of the Congress and Communist parties
 wanted democracy, but by their mere leadership they upheld the political domination of an
 elite."
 19. Nepal Press Digest 34:27, July 2, 1990.
 20. Nepal Press Digest 34:29, July 16, 1990.
 21. Nepal Press Digest 34:30, July 23, 1990.
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 Suggestions Made to the Constitution
 Recommendations Commission
 Most political parties agreed on the basic features of the new constitution.
 Other than these, the main points of controversy were religious freedom;
 the status of Nepali and the other languages of Nepal; the rights and repre-
 sentation in the administration of ethnic minorities, depressed castes and
 classes, the Tarai peoples, and women; and control of the army.
 Religious freedom. Two articles of the 1962 Constitution that concerned
 religion aroused controversy. Article 3(1) stated, "Nepal is an independ-
 ent, indivisible, and sovereign monarchical Hindu kingdom," while Article
 14 on "Right to Religion" (identical to Article 5 in the 1959 Constitution)
 stated, "every person may profess his own religion as handed down from
 ancient times and may practice it having regard to tradition. Provided
 that no person shall be entitled to convert another person from one reli-
 gion to another." Under this article, a number of people had received
 prison sentences for allegedly converting Nepali citizens to Christianity.
 The debate on these issues quickly became an impassioned argument be-
 tween secular state and Hindu state proponents. Those demanding a secu-
 lar state included Buddhist, Muslim, and Christian associations; ethnic
 organizations representing the predominantly non-Hindu, Tibeto-Burman
 tribes; and leftist, liberal, and republican elements. An enormous demon-
 stration organized by the Nepal Buddhist Association to demand a secular
 state brought some 10,000 marchers onto the streets of the capital on June
 30.
 These demands were strongly opposed by traditionalist Hindu organiza-
 tions, particularly the Sanatan Dharma Seva Samiti and the Nepal com-
 mittee of the Vishwa Hindu Parishad. The interim government's Minister
 for Housing, Achyut Raj Regmi, caused an uproar when he threatened a
 hunger strike if the constitution made Nepal a secular state. And when 12
 "religious prisoners" had their sentences remitted on June 15, the weekly
 Bimarsha claimed that the state had already become secular, even before
 the constitution had been drafted.22 The traditionalist Hindu stand re-
 flected concern that the declaration of Nepal as a secular state would open
 its borders to a flood of Christian missionaries, who might have political as
 well as religious patronage and motives. This paranoia became evident
 during June, when several proestablishment newspapers carried reports of
 mass conversions to Christianity in outlying districts.23
 22. Nepal Press Digest 34:26, June 25, 1990.
 23. The Vishwa Hindu Parishad sent a 108-member delegation to Upadhyaya on June 6,
 claiming that 30,000 Nepalis had been converted to Christianity since April. (Nepal Press
 Digest 34:24, June 11, 1990.) The Jana .Jagriti newspaper of July 2 reported that 48,000 had
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 The language issue. The demands of communal groups ranged from sug-
 gestions that Nepali should continue to be the national language but that
 other languages should be given some kind of constitutional status to de-
 mands that Nepali's status as a national language be abolished and that
 Nepal should become a federal state with each autonomous region having
 its own official language. There were strident calls from groups such as the
 Tarai-based Nepal Goodwill Council for the recognition of Hindi as a sec-
 ond national language.24
 Human rights. HURON (Human Rights Organization of Nepal),
 FOPHUR (Forum for the Protection of Human Rights), and Amnesty
 International all called for the abolition of the death penalty and for the
 endorsement by the government of international human rights conven-
 tions.25
 Control of the army. On June 23 a controversial circular was sent to all
 units of the Royal Nepalese Army directing them to submit the following
 suggestions to the Constitution Recommendations Commission: the king
 must continue to be the supreme commander-in-chief and field marshal of
 the army; the king should appoint the commander-in-chief, who should
 have constitutional status; and sovereignty should be vested in the king.
 Nepal should also remain a Hindu state.26
 On June 27 Nirmal Lama, leader of the NCP (4th Convention),
 threatened to resign from the Constitution Recommendations Commission
 and expressed strong doubts that the king would approve the new constitu-
 tion without extensive amendments. Clearly, the suspicion was growing
 that events were moving in the same direction as they had under King
 Mahendra in 1959-60; in that instance, the demand for a constituent as-
 sembly had also failed, the king had promulgated the constitution at the
 very last minute, only a week before the general election, and had revoked
 it and banned parties within 18 months. These suspicions were subse-
 quently fueled by the king's appointment of ambassadors without consul-
 tation with the interim government. On August 8 posters appeared in
 been converted in one day in Dhading District "due to financial allurements." (Nepal Press
 Digest 34:28, July 9, 1990.)
 24. These demands were not new; they were advanced vigorously during the 1950s and
 early 1960s, before King Mahendra's "royal coup" stifled debate. See Frederick F. Gaige,
 Regionalism and National Unity in Nepal (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975).
 On the other hand, the demands made by speakers of Tibeto-Burman languages other than
 Newari were quite without precedent.
 25. An Amnesty International mission visited Nepal in April 1990, and a memorandum
 was sent to the interim government in June recommending the incorporation of human rights
 safeguards in the new constitution.
 26. Nepal Press Digest 34:29, July 16, 1990.
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 Kathmandu in the name of Lama's party, claiming that a palace conspir-
 acy was underway. The posters claimed that the Constitution Recommen-
 dations Committee was being manipulated by the palace and forced to
 adopt provisions such as prohibiting debate of the king's conduct in the
 legislature. The posters were quickly removed and arrests were made, but
 even in January 1991, there were still slogans painted by the NCP (4th
 Convention) on Kathmandu streets. Mysteriously, however, Lama did not
 resign. By late August, he was promising that the new constitution would
 be even more democratic than the one promulgated in 1959. For instance,
 the king would not possess the power to declare an emergency as he had
 under Article 55 of the 1959 dispensation. Lama's change of stance may
 have been prompted by the compromise achieved between the ULF and
 Congress representatives on the commission, which led to accusations of
 the commission exceeding its brief. On August 23 Justice Upadhyaya an-
 nounced that the draft of the new constitution would be submitted to the
 king on August 31 and that the king would hand it over to the Council of
 Ministers for their perusal on the same day. He admitted that the mem-
 bers of the commission had not yet reached a decision on the issues of
 whether Nepal should be a Hindu or a secular state and of how the army
 should be controlled.
 From the end of August until the actual promulgation of the constitu-
 tion on November 9, the story is one of delay and controversy and of sev-
 eral apparent attempts by the palace to water down the document and
 retain the maximum possible powers.- On August 31 Justice Upadhyaya
 announced the completion of the draft, an outline of which appeared in the
 Gorkhapatra the following day. The constitution contained provisions for
 amending its three basic features of constitutional monarchy, multiparty
 democracy, and the vesting of sovereignty in the people. Some newspapers
 interpreted this as evidence of republican forces having undue influence in
 the commission-not a very convincing argument since under the draft
 constitution any change in the status of the monarchy could only be made
 with the monarch's prior consent. Other papers suggested that this was
 the work of "reactionaries," and commentators from all angles returned to
 the old theme of the palace stirring up controversy to delay promulgation
 and undermine democracy.
 The most likely explanation advanced for the surprising inclusion of
 these provisions appeared in the Gorkhapatra on September 1. The Nepali
 Congress had held the view for many years that the new constitution
 should enshrine the three basic features mentioned above. According to
 the Gorkhapatra, the ULF representatives on the commission announced
 at the eleventh hour that they had no faith in the first two of these. After a
 furious debate, the chairman achieved a compromise by including provi-
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 sions for amendment of these three concepts on the basis of a three-
 quarters majority vote in the legislature and a national referendum. He
 said, "the Constitution cannot be said to be binding on future generations.
 It can be amended, but a complex process has been adopted for amend-
 ments, in the belief that certain provisions should not be amended as easily
 as others."27 From this time onward, the leftist parties, who believed that
 they had scored a victory with the inclusion of these provisions, demanded
 immediate promulgation without changes, while the Congress continued
 to look for an opportunity to make these concepts inviolable. The palace,
 meanwhile, found a chance to exploit these differences to its own advan-
 tage.
 Justice Upadhyaya presented that draft of the new constitution to the
 king on September 10. The king then handed it to Bhattarai as agreed but
 sparked further controversy by instructing him to consider suggestions put
 forward by constitutional organs and political parties that had not been
 represented in the Recommendations Commission. On the advice of the
 Council of Ministers, he then extended the term of the commission up to
 the day of promulgation. There were widespread objections to the king's
 directive, most of which emanated from the Left, which demanded imme-
 diate promulgation. It was protested that "anti-people" elements would
 now have a say and that promulgation would be endlessly delayed. The
 Congress, however, did not complain too loudly; its opposition to the pro-
 visions for amendment were widely known, and there were probably also
 objections to the king's right to appoint ambassadors and to an article that
 required a two-thirds majority in both houses for the ratification of treaties
 with foreign countries. On September 26, G. P. Koirala said that it had
 been a "suicidal" decision to put the basic features of the constitution into
 a "state of uncertainty," since it would compel the king to engage actively
 in politics in order to safeguard his position.28
 The Council of Ministers reportedly made over 20 changes to the
 draft.29 The most important of these made it impossible to repeal or
 amend provisions if such an amendment contravened the spirit of the pre-
 amble, and another made it possible for Parliament to ratify treaties by a
 simple majority, except those treaties that related to strategic or military
 alliances or to the boundaries of Nepal. Apparently ULF representatives
 acquiesced to these changes after veiled threats had been made by the Con-
 gress to withdraw all cooperation if they did not. The constitution was
 submitted to the king by the prime minister on October 11, and the king
 27. Nepal Press Digest 34:38, September 17, 1990.
 28. Nepal Press Digest 34:40, October 1, 1990.
 29. Nepal Press Digest 34:42, October 15, 1990.
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 announced that he would study it, "to determine to what extent it was
 positive in the exercise of democracy."30
 The Palace Draft: A Final Crisis
 On October 16 the palace announced that the constitution would not be
 promulgated until after the national holiday of Tihar (i.e., after October
 20) and that consultations were still going on between the king and the
 prime minister. Some press reports suggested that the king had asked for
 improvements in the "language and organization" of the document; others
 felt that he had raised strong objections to a reference to the Democracy
 Movement in its preamble. On October 21 it became apparent that the
 palace had had objections to many other features of the constitution when
 a new draft was released to the press. It was claimed that this had been
 prepared jointly by the king and the prime minister, but it contained many
 fundamental differences from the revised draft submitted by the Council of
 Ministers. Some of the changes made in its preamble are summarized be-
 low:
 Original draft Palace draft
 "in accordance with the desire expressed clause removed
 by the people of Nepal through the
 historic people's movement for
 Constitutional change"
 "Framed through the broad "Whereas the happiness and
 participation of the Nepali people in prosperity of Nepal and the Nepali
 accordance with their desires" people have always been our sole
 objective, and we are determined to
 achieve that objective, and whereas it
 is desirable to frame and promulgate
 a Constitution . . ."
 "We hereby proclaim and promulgate this Constitution ...
 "on the advice and with the approval of ". . . in accordance with the
 [the] Council of Ministers" Constitutional laws, customs, usages
 and traditions of Nepal."
 "Whereas we have expressed the "Whereas our revered forefathers and
 determination from time to time to run ourselves have been running a polity
 the polity in accordance with the based on the public will"
 popular will"
 (Sovereignty vested in the Nepali "The sovereignty of Nepal shall be
 people) vested in the Nepali people, including
 His Majesty"
 30. Ibid.
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 According to the palace draft, there was to be a Rdj Parishad (council of
 state) to be appointed by the king with duties prescribed by the constitu-
 tion. A standing committee would offer advice to the king when requested
 and submit an annual report to him. Emergency powers were assigned
 solely to the king, who would have to present his proclamation of a state
 emergency post facto before the legislature within three months. The exec-
 utive, legislative, and judicial powers of the kingdom were all vested in the
 king, and would be exercised "in accordance with the Constitution and
 current law."31
 The interim government was stunned. Ganesh Man Singh said, "it is
 quite undemocratic to seek to promulgate a Constitution similar to that of
 1962. No sane person can do it." Bhattarai told the king's principal secre-
 tary to convey his resignation to the king, since he would be unable to gain
 endorsement of the draft from the Congress Party, the government, or the
 people. Leftist parties, student unions, and professional associations took
 to the streets to denounce the "palace conspiracy." The palace feigned
 surprise at the ferocity of this response. Disingenuously, a press note ex-
 pressed surprise at Bhattarai's offer of resignation, claiming that he had
 been fully consulted- something the prime minister denied. After hasty
 discussions between the king and Bhattarai, the palace backed down: a
 press note issued on October 23 said the royal draft was a "proposed
 draft" only. Two days later promulgation was promised for November 9.
 One of the most striking features of this story is the extent to which its
 final stage turned into a fundamental struggle over the constitution be-
 tween the palace and the interim government. It was a simple matter,
 devoid of democratic or constitutional niceties, of putting pressure on the
 king to remake the concessions that had officially been made several
 months before. Outside the palace gates, there was a general strike in
 Patan and a mass ULF rally in Kathmandu on October 27, while leftists
 burned copies of the palace draft and threatened to launch a new republi-
 can movement if the original constitution was not promulgated on Novem-
 ber 9. Inside the palace, the king spent four-and-a-half hours in talks with
 Congress leaders and Justice Upadhyaya on October 24. By the end of the
 day, agreement had been reached on the issues of multiparty democracy,
 constitutional monarchy, the vesting of sovereignty in the people, and
 human rights. The national anthem and the privileges of the royal family
 were still under discussion. G. P. Koirala warned, "we must remain alert,
 since we cannot be sure of anything until the Constitution is promul-
 gated."32
 31. Nepal Press Digest 34:44, October 29, 1990.
 32. Nepal Press Digest 34:45, November 5, 1990.
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 On November 9 it became clear that a compromise had been achieved
 that generally favored the demands of the Democracy Movement but still
 reserved important powers and privileges for the monarchy. Bhattarai de-
 scribed the 1990 Constitution as "a historic document" that guaranteed
 there would never again be "one-man rule" in Nepal. The moderate leftist
 groups accorded it a qualified welcome, but the NCP (4th Convention) and
 the ethnic and communal parties rejected it out of hand, since their de-
 mands had not been fulfilled. Proclaiming the constitution, King Birendra
 referred to the fact that democracy had been established in Nepal in 1951
 "through the cooperation of the King and the people," and ended with the
 long-fought-over sentence, "we hereby promulgate and enforce with im-
 mediate effect on the recommendation of the Council of Ministers the draft
 prepared by the Commission as the Constitution of the Kingdom of Nepal,
 1990" (emphasis added).
 The Main Features of the
 New Constitution
 An "unofficial" English translation of the 1990 Constitution is available,
 although unpublished, but only the original Nepali text has full legal
 force.33 The quotations given below are my own translations.
 The Kingdom of Nepal-sovereignty, religion, and language. Article 3
 states that "the sovereignty of Nepal is vested in the Nepali people," and is
 thus uncontroversial. However, Article 4(1) states: "Nepal is a multi-eth-
 nic, multi-lingual, democratic, independent, indivisible, sovereign, Hindu,
 Constitutional monarchical kingdom." The terms "multi-ethnic" and
 "multi-lingual" were probably intended to mollify the minorities who had
 been pressing claims on behalf of their languages and regions for months.
 But many commentators have objected to the insertion of the word
 "Hindu" here. They argue that, since the position of the Hindu king is
 safeguarded by Article 27(1)-which states that the king must be a descen-
 dant of Prithvinarayan Shah, an upholder of the Aryan culture, and a
 practicing Hindu-there was no need for Article 4(1) to make any state-
 ment whatsoever on either religion or secularism.
 33. The Nepali text of the 1990 Constitution was reproduced in the Gorkhapatra of 24
 Kartik 2047 (10 November 1990) and later in booklet form by the publishers of the magazine
 Antarrashtriya Manch (International Forum). Vol. 48 of the latter journal carries summaries
 on pp. 309-11 and pp. 350-54. See also "Samvidhan: Kranti ki Agni Pariksha- se Mila
 Praman Patra" (The constitution: A certificate received from the fire-test of revolution) in
 the newly launched Hindi journal, Nava Nepdl, vol. 1, pp. 6-12, and the "Constitution Spe-
 cial Edition" (Samvidha-n Vishesh) of the monthly Sindhu 21:5 (December 1990-January
 1991).
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 The 1990 Constitution also adopts a somewhat ambiguous position on
 the question of language. Whereas Article 4 of the 1962 Constitution sim-
 ply stated, "the National Language of Nepal is the Nepali language in the
 Devanagari script," the 1990 document hedges its bets by dividing its Arti-
 cle 6 into two clauses: 6(1) "The Nepali language in the Devanagari script
 is the state language (rashtrabhasha) of Nepal. The Nepali language shall
 be the language of the workings of Government." 6(2) "All languages spo-
 ken as mother-tongues in the various parts of Nepal are national languages
 (rashtrlya bhashd) of Nepal." Article 18(2) goes rather further, stating:
 "Every community shall be able to run schools so that education may be
 provided to children up to the primary level in their mother-tongues."
 The above articles were probably drafted to appease linguistic and reli-
 gious minorities. But it is already apparent that groups such as the Nepal
 Goodwill Party, which had demanded the status of a second national lan-
 guage for Hindi, along with Christian, Buddhist, and Muslim groups,
 which had demanded a secular state, are far from satisfied. The dissatis-
 faction of the Christian minority has been compounded by the fact that
 Article 14 of the 1962 Constitution that banned conversion has been re-
 tained as Article 19. This is certain to lead to continued protests by Chris-
 tian and human rights organizations since, if interpreted narrowly, it
 seems to require one to follow the religion of one's ancestors, not that of
 one's own choosing, and thus it has been claimed it contravenes Article 18
 of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights.34
 The Council of State (Raj Parishad). The council is to be formed by the
 king as an advisory body and is to designate a regent in the case of his
 mental or physical infirmity. This Raj Parishad, which consists of mem-
 bers of the royal family, the cabinet, and leading national figures, is
 modeled on the Raj Sabha of the old constitution but holds fewer powers.
 The executive. Executive authority in Nepal is vested in the king and the
 Council of Ministers, and the constitution makes it clear that all functions
 discharged by the king (other than those explicitly stated by the constitu-
 tion to be discretionary) should be discharged on the advice and with the
 consent of the Council of Ministers. The king is to appoint as prime minis-
 ter the leader of the party or coalition of parties that wins a clear majority
 in the House of Representatives. These provisions contrast strongly with
 those of 1962; Article 20(2) of the old constitution began: "The sover-
 eignty of Nepal is vested in His Majesty and all powers-executive, legisla-
 tive, and judicial- emanate from Him," while Article 24(2) stated: "The
 34. Rishikesh Shaha, "A Good Constitution that Could Be Better," Himal 3:4 (Novem-
 ber-December 1990), pp. 28-29.
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 question of whether His Majesty has consulted any person or authority
 under the provisions of this Constitution . .. shall not be inquired into by
 any court."
 The legislature. The legislature is to consist of three elements: the king, a
 House of Representatives (Pratinidhi Sabha) consisting of 205 members
 each elected from a district constituency; and a National Assembly (Rds-
 triya Sabha) consisting of 60 members of whom 10 will be royal nomi-
 nees-reputed persons who have made distinguished contributions to
 national life-35 (including at least three women) will be elected by the
 House of Representatives, and 15 will be elected from the five development
 regions through an electoral college system. The term of the House of
 Representatives will be five years, while the National Assembly will be a
 permanent body with one-third of its members retiring every two years.
 The form of the legislature represents a return to the 1959 Constitution,
 which provided for a 36-member Senate and an elected House of Repre-
 sentatives. In 1959, however, the king nominated 18 of the 36 senators,
 who served six-year terms, while the House of Representatives had only
 109 seats. The king, therefore, has far less say in the membership of his
 government now than he did under the democratic Constitution of 1959.
 The judiciary. The constitution provides for a three-tier judiciary-a
 Supreme Court, Appellate Courts, and District Courts. The chief justice is
 to be appointed on the recommendation of a constitutional council, other
 justices of the Supreme Court on the recommendation of a judicial council.
 The Supreme Court will have the power to declare any law ultra-vires of
 the constitution.
 Political parties. There appears to be almost total freedom to form polit-
 ical parties. However, a party must conform to certain rules if it is to be
 permitted to stand in national elections. It must not restrict membership
 on the basis of religion, community, caste, or region; its constitution and
 regulations must be democratic; its executive officebearers must be elected
 at least once every five years; and at least 5% of its candidates in elections
 must be women.35
 Emergency powers. Article 81 of the 1962 Constitution entitled the king
 to revoke the constitution in its entirety and assume to himself all powers
 of government-which is exactly what King Mahendra did in 1960 under
 a similar provision (Article 55) of the 1959 Constitution. There was, as a
 consequence, great concern lest the 1990 Constitution should again grant
 35. Under these rules, 3 of the 47 parties that applied to the Election Commission for
 registration early in 1991 had their requests turned down.
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 emergency powers to the king. This it most certainly has not done, but
 commentators such as Rishikesh Shaha point out a number of contradic-
 tions and ambiguities. According to Article 115, the king can declare a
 state of emergency in the event of a "grave threat to the sovereignty, unity,
 or security of any part of Nepal due to war, outside attack, armed rebel-
 lion, or serious economic disruption." The king's proclamation must be
 ratified by the House of Representatives within three months. Shaha
 claims that the constitution is not clear enough on the important question
 of whether the king is at liberty to proclaim a state of emergency without
 consulting his government. How, he asks, could the king "be expected to
 act by and with the advice and consent of the Council of Ministers [as laid
 down in Article 35(2)] while giving it advice and encouragement [as laid
 down in Article 43(2)]?" Shaha also claims that a clause that explicitly
 required the king to seek the consent of the Council of Ministers before
 declaring an emergency was deleted from the Constitution Commission's
 draft. But this may have been necessary in the event of an emergency
 arising when there is no Council of Ministers to give its consent as can
 happen in a parliamentary system.
 Amendments. Bills seeking to repeal or amend provisions of the constitu-
 tion may be tabled in either house, providing they do not "contravene the
 spirit of the Preamble." Such amendments require a two-thirds majority
 and the king's approval, although the king must approve such bills if they
 are presented to him a second time.
 The Royal Nepal Army. A compromise was reached on the matter of
 control of the army. The king is to retain the title of supreme commander-
 in-chief but will appoint the commander-in-chief on the prime minister's
 recommendation, and a National Security Council headed by the prime
 minister will take charge of all other military operations.
 Conclusion: Did the Mango Tree
 Bear Oranges?
 The new constitution did meet the demands of the Democracy Movement:
 political parties are free to organize, the proportion of the legislature that
 is directly elected is larger than it has ever been, and the power of the
 palace, though still substantial, has been greatly reduced. But communal
 groups have been granted only minor, nonfundamental concessions.
 Though Radio Nepal now broadcasts news bulletins in Hindi and Newari,
 full news summaries may only be heard in Nepali or English. Similarly,
 Nepali remains the language of government and postprimary education
 throughout the kingdom. Some concessions have been made to women's
 groups but these are mostly nominal, while the demand for a secular state
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 forced only one change: the granting of a right to all sects and denomina-
 tions to run and maintain their own institutions. The demands of Tarai
 organizations have been largely ignored. Human rights groups have been
 more successful: the death penalty has been abolished, there is protection
 against discrimination on the basis of religion, race, or gender, and protec-
 tion against preventative detention. Unfortunately, some of these rights
 are granted only to Nepali citizens, while the constitution itself discrimi-
 nates against women in its section on nationality; according to Article 9,
 the children of male citizens are considered Nepali by descent, while those
 of female citizens must reside in Nepal for 15 years before they can become
 citizens.
 The 1990 Constitution of Nepal represented something of a compromise
 between the palace and the Congress, and the Left was slightly marginal-
 ized. Republicans cannot be happy with a dispensation that still assigns
 considerable powers and privileges to the monarch and his family, and it
 must be admitted that the record of April to November 1990 did give
 cause for doubt over whether the palace had truly acquiesced to its
 semiconstitutional role or would actually act in every instance after sincere
 consultations with elected bodies. This may often have depended on the
 quality of the advice received by the king himself. On several occasions,
 King Birendra has acted decisively in line with public opinion, after the
 people had made their feelings known directly to him. It often seemed in
 the past, however, that the decision-making process in Nepal was domi-
 nated by the highly conservative Palace Secretariat. The weakening of the
 Secretariat that one assumes has followed the election of a new govern-
 ment can only strengthen democracy in Nepal.
 Compared with the earlier constitutions of Nepal- particularly with
 the 1962 dispensation-the 1990 Constitution represented a dramatic ad-
 vance in the evolution of a democratic, constitutional order in Nepal.
 Whether it will actually work in practice depends on whether the palace
 and the political parties can cooperate in its implementation and whether
 the growth of communalism witnessed during 1990 will be recognized and
 contained. Further struggles to amend the constitution are not impossible,
 although the precedent of 1960-which filled every Nepali politician's
 mind during 1990-seems to be fading from view. So far, it seems, the
 mango tree bears oranges of a sort; the earnest hope in Nepal last year was
 that the palace would not reach out to pick them again and that the consti-
 tution would not be tested by the Supreme Court to establish whether such
 fruits were forbidden.
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